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fiable support order may not be entitled to full faith and credit is
inconsequential, since, by virture of the above definition, the act
states that effect must be given to such non-final judgments. By
adopting this registration provision, the legislature has emphatically
granted more than is required by the full faith and credit clause.
Furthermore, the registration procedure is very similar to that of
the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.84 Texas has
not adopted this uniform act, but registration of a modifiable sup-
port order has been upheld by a sister state which has adopted it."
IV. CONCLUSION
Many uncertainties in the application of the U.R.E.S.A. exist, as
is to be expected in an act which is designed to apply in all states.
It is understandable then, that problems will arise when each state
attempts to apply it under its particular laws. However, the wording
and spirit of the new act indicate the willingness of the Texas
Legislature to foster comity and cooperation. Any uncertainties in
the act should be judicially resolved in accordance with the obvious
legislative intent. The new Texas act is almost identical to the latest
Uniform Act of the the State Commissioners. Previous versions of
the U.R.E.S.A. have been adopted by all states; therefore, there are
excellent prospects of unprecedented inter-state cooperation on a
national scale. Today's highly mobile society makes full compliance
with the new act a necessary and very desirable goal.
Gerald William Ostarch
Sharing Arrangements - A Warning
I. GENERAL TAX PROVISIONS
Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 defines gross
income for tax purposes as "all income from whatever source de-
rived" including compensation for services.' The concept of income
includes property received as well as cash. Thus, when services are
exchanged for property, the fair market value (as closely as may
be ascertained) must be reported as income This rule has been
84 9A Uniform Laws Annotated 474 (1965).
" Light v. Light, 12 Ill. App. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1957). See Comment, 27 Mo. L.
Rev. 500 (1962).
'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61.
'Treas. Reg. § 1.61-(2) (1957).
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applied in a number of cases in which interests in oil properties were
received in exchange for the contribution of various services not
concerned directly with the development of the properties.'
II. SHARING ARRANGEMENTS AND PARTNERSHIPS IN
OIL AND GAS TAXATION
Several exceptions to these general rules exist in the field of oil
and gas taxation. This note will consider these exceptions in the light
of two recent decisions of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
A. Sharing Arrangements
A sharing arrangement is one in which the grantor, usually the
owner of an oil lease, conveys an interest in the minerals in return
for some contribution which aids in the development of the property.4
The assignee shares the burden and the risk of developing the prop-
erty with the owner; he obligates himself to participate directly in
the development and to look solely to his interest in the minerals
for any possibility of reimbursement or profit.' In the case of a
service contributor, the agreement may provide that the contributor
is entitled to no return on this "investment of capital" until the
grantor recovers his expenses.
The Internal Revenue Service first stated the tax consequences of
the sharing arrangement transaction in S. M. 3322' in which the
service acknowledged that when services (e.g., the drilling of a well)
were exchanged for a part of the working interest, the grantor
recognized no taxable gain or loss." The tax effect upon the assignee
in a sharing arrangement was considered in G. C. M. 932 which
stated that where "the very drilling costs constitute the consideration
for the acquisition of the producing rights [they] can be nothing
else but capital investment returnable by way of depletion against
production."' Later decisions' have developed the position that one
who drills a well and receives an interest in minerals in return, has
3Massey v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1944); Walls v. Commissioner, 60
F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1932) (legal services); Thomas Blake, 20 T. C. 721 (1953). Cf.,
Parr v. Scofield, 185 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1951) (commission for securing leases).4 Breeding and Burton, Taxation of Oil and Gas Income 38 (1954).
' Ibid.
61V-I Cum. Bull. 112 (1925).
'Ibid. See also, Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943); Rogan v. Blue
Ridge Oil Co., 83 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 574 (1937); Thompson
v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1928).8
VI-1 Cum. Bull. 241 (1927).9 Dearing v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1936), affirming 36 B.T.A. 843
(1936). See also, Commissioner v. Edwards Drilling Co., 95 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1938),
affirming 35 B.T.A. 341 (1935); Cook Drilling Co., 38 B.T.A. 291 (1938).
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made an investment in the oil and gas in place and therefore recog-
nizes no taxable income at the time of investment.
G. C. M. 227300 collected and analyzed the earlier decisions in
this area and concluded that drillers, equipment dealers, and investors
who contribute to the acquisition and development of oil property,
in exchange for an economic interest in that property, have made a
capital investment and will recognize no income with respect to the
interest received. 1 In reaching this conclusion, the ruling adopted the
"pool of capital" reasoning first employed in Palmer v. Bender."
According to this doctrine, the character of the oil in place is that
of a reservoir of the capital investments of the parties entitled to
share in the properties under the agreement. The assignee relieves the
assignor of a portion of the risks, costs, and burdens of development,
in return for which he obtains a capital asset; therefore, the con-
tributor's costs should be capitalized and not expensed. This capital
investment is recovered by way of depletion. 3
In order for transactions to be included within the scope of the
ruling, certain basic requirements must be satisfied:
(1) The contribution must add to the pool of capital necessary
to develop the property (i.e., it must assist in performing an explora-
tory or developmental function necessary to bring the property into
production).
(2) The interest received must be in the same property in con-
nection with which the contributions were made and it must be
expressly agreed that such an interest will be acquired.
(3) The contributor must look solely to the economic interest
acquired for any possibility of profit."
This ruling exempts from taxation only the receipt of the prop-
erty interest. Any subsequent income received from the property
will be recognized and taxed as ordinary income.
G. C. M. 22730 does not expressly describe an instance in which
one contributing services receives an interest; but because drillers
must contribute services as well as equipment, the ruling would
seem to cover an interest acquired in exchange for services. This
"1941-1 Cum. Bull. 214 (1941).
"Id. at 221.
12 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
13id. at 558.
'4 G. C. M. 22730, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 214.
" If, in addition to his interest, the contributor should receive cash or other property,
it is generally recognized that he may realize a taxable gain or loss through his receipt of the
cash or other property, but the receipt of the economic interest is still regarded as a non-
taxable transaction. See, G. C. M. 22332, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 228; and, Shelton, The Taxation
of Oil and Gas Interests Received in Payment for Property or Services, Southwestern Legal
Foundation, Fifth Annual Inst. on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 440 (1954).
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position has been followed in many private ruling letters issued by
the Internal Revenue Service to taxpayers stating that geologists,
brokers, lawyers, and accountants providing services in connection
with the development of the property in exchange for an interest
therein recognized no taxable income.
This position appears to have been adopted by the Fifth Circuit
in Commissioner v. Rowan Drilling Co.," although the court never
expressly mentioned the ruling. Relying on the same cases which
form the basis of G. C. M. 22730, the court stated:
It is no longer open to doubt that the ownership of oil in place is a
capital asset, and that the acquisition price of the asset, whether paid
in cash or services, is a capital investment that may not be treated as a
business expense for income-tax purposes, but must be recouped by
depletion deductions from gross income.
B. Partnerships
No gain or loss is recognized when one contributes property to a
partnership in exchange for an interest in that partnership. s Simi-
larly, a service contributor recognizes no taxable income except where
an existing partner relinquishes to the contributor any part of his
right to be repaid his capital contribution (as distinguished from his
share of partnership profits)." In the latter case, the service con-
tributor will be treated as dealing with the partnership individually
and not as a partner, and the value of any property which the con-
tributor receives will be considered taxable income under section 61.
16130 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1942).
'Id. at 63.
sInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 721.
19 Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b) (1) (1956) states:
Normally, under local law, each partner is entitled to be repaid his contribu-
tions of money or other property to the partnership (at the value placed upon
such property by the partnership at the time of contribution) whether made
at the formation of the partnership or subsequent thereto. To the extent that
any of the partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid his contribu-
tions (as distinguished from a share in partnership profits) in favor of another
partner as compensation for services, section 721 does not apply. The value of
an interest in such partnership capital so transferred to a partner as compensa-
tion for services constitutes income to the partner under section 61. The
amount of such income is the fair market value of the interest in capital so
transferred, either at the time the transfer is made for past services or at the
time the services have been rendered where the transfer is conditioned on the
completion of the transferee's future services. The time when such income is
realized depends on all the facts and circumstances, including any substantial
restrictions or conditions on the compensated partner's right to withdraw or
otherwise dispose of such interest.
For supporting case authority, see Ferris v. Commissioner, 222 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1955);
Haphold v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1944); Weiner v. Campbell, 44 A.F.T.R.




III. LEWIS V. COMMISSIONEV.'
At the request of the owners of the lease, Lewis, a petroleum
engineer, made a preliminary study and made certain proposals with
respect to installing a waterflood program on a lease. In November,
1953, Lewis and two of the principal owners reached a basic agree-
ment which provided that if and when the owners of the lease
elected to proceed with a full scale waterflood program, Lewis would
prepare a schedule of production and, upon approval of the owners,
would supervise the operation. Compensation for his services there-
tofore rendered was to be $35,000. Compensation for future services
was to be $65,000, payable out of production, if and when the
total proceeds from 1/8 of 7/8 of total production amounted to
$35,000. When the oil payment had been paid, he was then entitled
to a fractional overriding royalty. This agreement was not acted
upon until May, 1956, when a pilot waterflood program was initiated
by Lewis at the owners' request. In September, 1957, a full scale
program was begun, and in October, 1957, the oil payment and over-
riding royalty value were assigned. The Revenue Service claimed that
the fair market value of the oil payment and royalty should be
treated as income.
Lewis argued that although it does not expressly mention strictly
personal services, G. C. M. 22730 should be applied; that one who
performs engineering services in exchange for an interest in the oil
properties has made as equally an essential contribution to the "pool
of investment" required to bring the property into production as one
who provides equipment as well as services. The Commissioner con-
tended that since G. C. M. 22730 does not expressly mention engi-
neers or others contributing strictly personal services, such an interp-
retation should not be read into it. The Fifth Circuit, like the Tax
Court before it,2" did not decide the case on that issue, however, but
held that since the services performed were in the area of production
rather than development or exploration, G. C. M. 22730 was in-
applicable. A waterflood program is a method of recovering oil from
a present producing horizon by injecting water into the oiled sand
in order to supplement the existing reservoir pressure. It had been
generally felt that a waterflood program such as here existed was
more in the nature of development than a producing or operating
function.2 Nevertheless, the court, after hearing expert testimony on
2'1 339 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1964).
22 39 T. C. 482 (1962).
22 Fiske, Federal Taxation of Oil and Gas Transactions § 307 (1958); Kirgis and Turner,
Tax Aspects of the Receipt of an Economic Interest in Oil and Gas Property in Return for
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both sides, decided that it was a producing function in this case. 4
The court then stated an important dictum which suggests serious
doubt as to the continued applicability of G. C. M. 22730 to any
transaction involving an exchange of services for property. Judge
Tuttle stated: "Unless a careful analysis of the reasons underlying
the issuing of the G. C. M. 22730 compelled it, the Court would
have great difficulty accepting a construction of the Code that would
fly in the face of the general provisions of the tax laws to the effect
that compensation for services must be returned as a part of gross
income."" This statement appears to be particularly significant when
considered with the decision of the same court in Frazell.
IV. UNITED STATES V. FRAZELL"
William Frazell was a geologist, who in February, 1951, entered
into a contract with the W. H. Wheless Oil Company, a part-
nership. Frazell was to check certain areas to determine whether
potentially productive oil and gas properties might be procured.
In return for his services, Frazell was to receive "a monthly salary
or drawing account" plus expenses and specified interests in the
property acquired. He was not to be considered as owning an in-
terest in the property until Wheless and Woolf recovered their
full costs and expenses from the properties. By the early part of
1955, it became apparent that Wheless and Woolf would recover
their entire costs and expenses by November, 1955. In April, 1955,
the 1951 contract was terminated and the properties acquired under
the earlier arrangement were transferred to the W. W. F. Corpora-
tion (formed specifically to acquire these properties) in return for
the issuance of debentures to Wheless and Woolf and stock to
Wheless, Woolf, and Frazell. Frazell's thirteen per cent of this stock
had a fair market value of $91,000, but he included no part of this
amount in his 1955 return.
Frazell argued that the agreement whereby he was to receive an
interest in the oil properties was a joint venture or partnership ar-
rangement. The Commissioner contended that the entire agreement
was an employment contract in which the section anticipating the
Services Rendered, P-H Oil and Gas Taxes 5 1008.1 (1964); Assignment of an Economic
Interest for Personal Services, 1 Oil & Gas Tax Q. 18 (1952); Shelton, supra note 15.
14 In so doing, the Fifth Circuit cited the opinion of the Tax Court which stated: "The
program consists of the introduction of water into the underground reservoir or oil sand
for the purpose of . . . recovering oil in place from the present producing horizon." 339
F.2d 706, 710 (5th Cir. 1964).
25 Id. at 709.
335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965).
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transfer of a portion of the interest in the oil properties was merely
expressing an additional means of compensation for services rendered.
The district court concluded that a joint venture had been formed,7
and section 351 (a)21 was applied to make the subsequent transfer of
partnership property to the corporation in return for stock a non-
taxable transaction. The court of appeals agreed that this was in
fact a joint venture but reversed the district court, declaring that
income was to be recognized by Frazell. According to the court, the
transaction whereby Frazell obtained his share of the corporation's
stock could be viewed in either of two ways: (1) that so much of
the partnership interest traded for stock as was compensation for his
services was taxable as ordinary income to him under Treasury regu-
lation, section 1.721 (b) (1),'9 or (2) so much of the stock received
in compensation for his services was taxable under section 351 (a) .0
The court did not wish to "split hairs and choose between them."'"
Since Frazell did contribute maps to the venture, however, the case
was remanded to determine the value of these maps, as they would
fall within the non-recognition provisions of section 351 (a). In a
short dissenting opinion,a Judge Hutcheson expressed agreement
with the district judge's opinion and concluded that the Commis-
sioner's position was highly technical and unsubstantiated."
This decision confuses the interpretation of section 721 transactions
as they apply to the oil and gas area. The agreement "that Frazell
should not be entitled to, nor shall be considered as owning any
interest until such time as Wheless and Woolf shall have recovered
their full costs and expenses of said properties '  appears to contem-
plate a return of the capital contributions to W. and W., and there-
fore the transaction should be tax free. In the Fifth Circuit's opinion,
only the latter portion of regulation 1.721-1(b)as was cited, and
the first two sentences of the regulation were entirely omitted.
27213 F. Supp. 457 (W.D. La. 1963).
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 351(a): "No gain or loss shall be recognized if the prop-
erty is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or
securities in such corporation .... For purposes of this section, stock or securities issued for
services shall not be considered as issued in return for property."
25 See note 19 supra.
25 See note 28 supra.
s 335 F.2d at 491.
32213 F. Supp. at 470.
2Judge Hutcheson's concurring opinion in Commissioner v. Rowan Drilling Co., 130
F.2d 63 (5th Cii. 1942), was relied upon by the government. In this decision, Judge Hutche-
son set forth the theory that a person receiving an oil payment for services rendered should
be treated as though he had performed the services for cash and had taken that cash and
invested it in the oil payment.
34213 F. Supp. 457.
2" See note 19 supra.
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Counsel for Frazell then contended that the court in "overlooking"
this portion of the regulation had committed error, and that an
application of the remainder of the regulation to the facts of the
case would require a contrary result. The court examined this con-
tention upon rehearing" and concluded that had Frazell not been
granted a thirteen per cent interest, Wheless and Woolf would have
been entitled to the entire capital of the venture and that it was
never contended, nor would the record support the contention that
the recoupment was a return of capital rather than a skimming of
profits."7 Since this was a transfer of capital from one of the partners,
the non-recognition provisions of section 721 did not apply.
In order to apply the court's alternative to this fact situation,
Frazell's partnership interest would have to be considered non-
possessory at the time of the issuance of the stock so that the trans-
action would fall without the non-recognition provisions of section
351 (a). " The fact that Wheless and Woolf had not recouped their
entire costs at the time of the transfer of stock might be used to
support this reasoning. The substance of the 1951 agreement, how-
ever, clearly indicates that Frazell's carried interest became possessory
before the transfer of the stock and that the stock transfer was
merely formal evidence of his previously obtained property rights.a"
G. C. M. 22730 and the doctrine of tax-free receipt for services
under the pool of capital theory is never mentioned in either the
district court or the court of appeals decisions. Possibly, the court
is denying the application of the sharing arrangement concept be-
cause the partnership provisions of the Code may be applied. On the
other hand, counsel for Frazell did not contend that such a sharing
arrangement concept should be applied. The issue was raised only in
" United States v. Frazell, 339 F.2d 885 (sth Cir. 1965).
3 Had he [Frazell] not been so compensated, Wheless and Woolf woud have
been entitled to the entire capital of the venture. In transferring a 13% in-
terest to Frazell, they necessarily gave up a portion of their own capital inter-
ests. This fact is in no way altered by their having reserved the right to take
the first $1,245,106 out of the profits of the venture. It has never been con-
tended that this recoupment was a return of capital to Wheless and Woolf
rather than a skimming of profits, and no such contention could be supported
on this record.
339 F.2d at 886.
as See note 29 supra.
as Frazell had an economic interest which requires merely a right to share in the oil
produced (even though legal title may be in the hands of another), and this interest is
possessory. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23(m)-1 (b) (1956), defines economic interests: "An eco-
nomic interest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer has acquired by investment
any interest in mineral in place . . . and secures by any form of legal relationship, income
derived from the severance and sale of the mineral . . . to which he must look for a return
of capital."
See also Commissioner v. Happold, 141 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1944).
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one of the amicus curiae briefs"' where it was contended that Frazell
first acquired an interest in the properties through a taxfree exchange
for services under G. C. M. 22730 and then contributed his interest
to the partnership along with the interests contributed by the other
owners. In reply, the government contended that the services were
rendered to the partnership which, in turn, invested in the properties.
Whether the court agreed that G. C. M. 22730 was not applicable
in this case or whether it simply did not utilize it since the partner-
ship provisions also apply is not completely clear.
There is considerable doubt as to just what reasoning the court did
apply to the problems raised in Frazell.45 Originally, the basic ground
of contention was whether the agreement was in substance an em-
ployment agreement or a joint venture agreement. Although the
courts called it a joint venture agreement, they seemed continually
perplexed by a situation which was complicated by the fact that "the
parties did not expressly regulate all the incidents of their legal re-
lationship,""2 and just how much this apparent doubt as to the nature
of the agreement might have influenced their decision cannot be
ascertained.
V. CONCLUSION
Read independently, the Lewis and Frazell decisions seem to be of
limited significance. The opinion in Lewis would merely indicate that
after weighing conflicting expert testimony, the court concluded
that a waterflood program was a type of productive activity and
therefore, according to recognized principles, would not fit into the
classification of non-taxable transactions contemplated under G. C. M.
22730. Assuming this determination, the other views expressed by
the court, although quite strongly worded, should be considered as
dicta and nothing more. In Frazell, the court, in a particular fact
situation, viewed the transaction as the shifting of capital from one
" Brief for Frazell as Amicus Curiae.
" Counsel for the United States submits that the court adopted the following reasoning
in reaching their conclusion:
1) the value of property received for services regardless of form, is taxable
as ordinary income.
2) the value the taxpayer received was primarily in return for services.
3) it was taxable when received or when it accrued.
4) the taxpayer initially received a substantially restricted right to future
compensation in the form of a full participating interest in the joint ven-
ture's properties.
5) the restrictions were removed from the right when the venture was liqui-
dated and the taxpayer given stock having a determinable market value.
6) at that time he realized income.
Brief for Petitioner, p. 8.
42213 F. Supp. 457 (W.D. La. 1963).
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partner to the service contributor and thus constituting a taxable
transaction under either section 351(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code or 1.72 1-1 (b) of the Treasury regulations.
When read together, however, the decisions may be significant.
The fact that the same court which issued a strong condemnation of
the non-recognition principles of G. C. M. 22730 has in a companion
case refused to apply this ruling to a fact situation in which it appears
to be squarely in point reflects serious doubts as to the continued
vitality of the non-recognition doctrine. Additional hints of a change
in position have recently occurred but these can hardly be considered
conclusive.'
Dissatisfaction with the decision in Lewis stems from the question-
able classification of a waterflood program as an element of produc-
tion. If the principle underlying G. C. M. 22730 is to be abandoned,
the proper procedure is to issue a new ruling to this effect; amending
the principle through court decisions which penalize those who have
relied upon it is clearly inequitable. As for G. C. M. 22730 "flying
in the face" of the general tax provisions, a careful analysis of the
reasoning behind it should indicate that such transactions are a form
of capital investment (highly speculative investments at that), and
should not result in a recognition of income."
To interpret Frazell as weakening the "pool of capital" doctrine is
to read something into the case which simply is not there. Frazell's
attorney never argued that G. C. M. 22730 applied; he chose to
base his argument solely on the partnership rules, particularly those
dealing with the return of partnership capital; and thus, the prece-
dent value of the case is extremely uncertain.
Certain peculiarities will probably limit the decision to its par-
ticular facts. The agreement involved was drafted primarily as an
employment agreement by the attorney for Wheless and Woolf.
He was naturally striving to obtain maximum tax benefits for his
client and did not necessarily have Frazell's best interests at heart.
As a result, the carelessly drafted contract failed to separate properly
the compensation terms from the carried interest arrangement. The
characterization of the instrument as an employment agreement seems
to have infected the whole proceeding.
" A most interesting development is the recent modification of the regulations under
section ?04 of the Code which contemplates the "carrying" of service contributors. One
example under this regulation was changed so that now one who is characteristically a
capital contributor (a business proprietor) is entitled to a share in the partnership profit
as opposed to the previous example of one who is characteristically a service contributor
(electronics engineer). 1964-2 Cum. Bull. 177.
"See notes 10-13 supra and accompanying text.
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